

, that which doth any way
depend'
a superior being as its cause. — And
there must needs be the same
equivocation in the word *fliympw*, so
that this in' like manner may be taken
also, either *xf^{oww}«>c»* for that
which is *iugtttwratc* in respect of time,
as having no temporary beginning; or
else for that which is *i** *at/u'ifroy*,
ingenerate or unproduced from any :-- in
which latter sense, that word *ayWw*, or
unmade, is of equal force and extent
with *ftM&wwmfrot'* or *miro-ytvcc*, that
which is self-sub-sisilent or Keif-
originated ; — and accordingly it was *uwd*
by those Pagan Theists, who
concluded *<*rt v\ii uyivtfrosi* i.e. that
matter was unmade — that is, not only
existed from eternity without begin-
ning, but also was self-existent, and
independent upon any superior cause.
Now, as to the former of these two
senses of those words, *-ysvijrov* and *a-*
*yinifToi**, the generality of the ancient
Pagans, and together with them
Plato, affirmed the world, and all
the inferior gods, to be *ya^roue*, to
have been made in time— or lo have had
a beginning; (for whatever the latter
Platonists pretend, this was
undoubtedly Plato's notion of that word,
and no other, when he concluded the
world to be *yififrop*, forasmuch as
himself expressly opposes it to *oitrov*,
that which is eternal.) But, on the
contrary, Aristotle, and the
latter Platonists, determined the
world, and all the inferior gods, to lie
in this sense *ayewirovc*, such as had no
tern*' porary beginning— 'but were
from eternity. However, according to the
latter sense of those words, 'all tlift
Pagan theologers agreed together,"
that the world, and all the inferior
gods, whether imving a beginning,
or existing from eternity,